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A Theory of Quasi-Constitutional
Legislation
VANESSA MACDONNELL*
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court of Canada has treated a small number of statutes as
quasi-constitutional. Despite the longstanding presence of quasi-constitutional statutes in
Canadian law, however, the Court has yet to articulate comprehensive criteria for recognizing
a statute or regulation as quasi-consitutional. In this article, I argue that quasi-constitutional
legislationor more accurately, some provisions in quasi-constitutional legislationshould
be understood as implementing constitutional imperatives. I use the term constitutional
imperatives to refer to constitutional obligations of varying degrees of specificity that emanate
from the rights-conferring aspects of the Constitution, as well as from those aspects of the
Constitution that establish the institutions and procedures of government. Understanding
quasi-constitutional legislation as implementing constitutional imperatives has several
implications. First, it suggests that quasi-constitutional legislation is a much larger category
than the existing case law implies. Second, it emphasizes the importance of politicians as
constitutional actors. And third, it helps us understand that the Constitution influences
non-constitutional law in ways that go beyond establishing the boundaries of permissible
lawmaking. I conclude by showing that quasi-constitutional legislation in Canada is different
in kind than the now much-discussed constitutional statute in the United Kingdom.
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Depuis les années 1970, la Cour suprême du Canada a traité un petit nombre de statuts
comme quasi-constitutionnels. Malgré la présence depuis longtemps de statuts
quasi-constitutionnels dans la législation canadienne, la Cour n’a cependant pas encore
entièrement expliqué dans quelles circonstances un statut ou un texte réglementaire
doit être considéré quasi-constitutionnel. Dans cet article, je soutiens que la législation
quasi-constitutionnelle ou, plus précisément, certaine dispositions de la législation
quasi-constitutionnelle doivent être réputées s’accompagner d’impératifs constitutionnels.
J’utilise le terme impératifs constitutionnels pour désigner des obligations constitutionnelles
de divers degrés de spécificité qui émanent des dispositions de la Constitution du Canada qui
confèrent des droits, de même que des dispositions qui établissent les institutions et les
procédures du gouvernement. Considérer que la législation quasi-constitutionnelle met en
œuvre des impératifs constitutionnels comporte de nombreuses implications. Cela suggère
tout d’abord que la législation quasi-constitutionnelle constitue une catégorie beaucoup
plus vaste que ne semble l’indiquer la jurisprudence. Cela insiste ensuite sur l’importance
des politiciens comme acteurs constitutionnels. Troisièmement, cela nous permet de
comprendre que la Constitution influence le droit non constitutionnel d’une manière qui
dépasse l’établissement des frontières du processus législatif permissible. Je conclue en
montrant que la législation quasi-constitutionnelle n’a pas au Canada la même nature que le
statut constitutionnel qui fait aujourd’hui au Royaume-Uni l’objet de nombreuses discussions.
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SINCE THE 1970S, THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (SCC) has treated a small

number of statutes as quasi-constitutional. These statutes, which the Court has
described as “not quite constitutional but certainly more than ordinary,”1 include

1.

Ontario Human Rights @Commission v Simpson-Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 547, 52 OR
(2d) 799 [Simpson-Sears]; Pierre Bossett & Michel Coutu, “Acte fondateur ou loi ordinaire?
Le statut de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne dans l’ordre juridique québécois”
(June 2015) RQDI 37. I will distinguish between ordinary, quasi-constitutional, and
constitutional laws throughout.
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human rights acts, privacy and official languages legislation,2 and statutory bills
of rights such as the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Quebec Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms.3 Although quasi-constitutional statutes are enacted in the
same way as other laws,4 they are interpreted in the broad and generous manner
usually reserved for constitutional rights.5 They also trump later, conflicting
ordinary laws unless those laws provide otherwise.6 This trumping rule has
significant consequences for laws that fall short of the guarantees found in
quasi-constitutional statutes.
Despite the longstanding presence of these statutes in Canadian law, however,
the Court has yet to articulate comprehensive criteria for recognizing a statute
or regulation as quasi-constitutional.7 Some quasi-constitutional statutes contain
supremacy clauses mandating the application of the trumping rule described
above and signalling to courts that Parliament intended the law to be treated as
quasi-constitutional.8 Just as often, however, the Court’s decision to treat a statute
as quasi-constitutional flows from the close relationship between these statutes
and constitutional rights.9 Much more work remains to be done to develop a
theory of quasi-constitutional statutes in Canada.
In this article, I argue that quasi-constitutional legislation—or more
accurately, some provisions in quasi-constitutional legislation10—should be

2.

Leonid Sirota, “Quasi-Constitutional Rights?” (22 April 2012), Double Aspect (blog),
online: <www.doubleaspectblog.wordpress.com/2012/04/22/quasi-constitutional-rights>.
3. Walter Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights, 2nd ed (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1975); André Morel, “La Charte québécoise: un document unique dans l’histoire legislative
canadienne” (1987) 21:1 RJT 1 at 20-21.
4. Mélanie Samson, “L’interprétation constitutionelle et l’interprétation discale, encore aux
antipodes?” (2010) 15:2 Lex Electronica 1.
5. Thibodeau v Air Canada, 2014 SCC 67, [2014] 3 SCR 340 [Thibodeau]; Ruth Sullivan,
Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada,
2014) at 497-508.
6. Sullivan, ibid; Sirota, supra note 2; Tarnopolsky, supra note 3; Claire Mummé, “At
the Crossroads in Discrimination Law: How the Human Rights Codes Overtook the
Charter in Canadian Government Services Cases” (2012) 9 JL & Equality 103; Luc B
Tremblay, The Rule of Law, Justice and Interpretation (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1997) at 88.
7. Sirota, supra note 2.
8. Tremblay, supra note 6.
9. Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25,
[2003] 1 SCR 66; Tremblay, supra note 6.
10. See infra for a discussion of terminology.
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understood as implementing constitutional imperatives.11 I use the term
“constitutional imperatives” to refer to constitutional obligations of varying
degrees of specificity. These obligations emanate from the rights-conferring
aspects of the Constitution12 as well as from those aspects of the Constitution
that establish the institutions and procedures of government.
Understanding quasi-constitutional legislation as implementing
constitutional imperatives has several implications. First, it suggests that
quasi-constitutional legislation is a much larger category than the existing case
law implies. This raises the question of whether the rules of interpretation that
apply to quasi-constitutional legislation should be reconsidered. Second, because
it emphasizes the role of the executive and the legislature in constitutional
implementation, this conception of quasi-constitutional legislation reaffirms
that politicians are important constitutional actors. Constitutional scholarship
continues to focus disproportionately on courts.13 Finally, the study of
11. On constitutional implementation, see Mattias Kumm, “Who’s Afraid of the Total
Constitution?” in Agustín José Menéndez & Erik Oddvar Eriksen, eds, Arguing
Fundamental Rights (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2006) 113 at 115. See also Mark
Tushnet, “Institutions for Implementing Constitutional Law” in Ian Shapiso et al, eds,
Rethinking Political Institutions: The Art of the State (New York: NYU Press, 2006) 241
[Tushnet, “Institutions for Implementing”]; Jennifer Nedelsky, “Legislative Judgment and
the Enlarged Mentality: Taking Religious Perspectives” in Richard W Bauman & Tsvi
Kahana, eds, The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 93 at 95, 121.
12. I use the term “Constitution” here in the same broad sense as the SCC in Re Resolution
to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753 at 874, 125 DLR (3d) 1. The majority
explained that the Constitution consists of “the global system of rules and principles
which govern the exercise of constitutional authority in the whole and in every part of
the Canadian state.” Contra Constitution Act, 1982, pt VII, s 52(2), Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (defining “Constitution of Canada” much more
narrowly). Generally, see Adam Dodek, “Uncovering the Wall Surrounding the Castle of
the Constitution: Judicial Interpretation of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982” in Emmett
MacFarlane, ed, Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2016) [forthcoming].
13. Vanessa MacDonnell, “The Constitution as Framework for Governance” (2013) 63:4 UTLJ
624 at 625-26 [MacDonnell, “Constitution as Framework”]; William N Eskridge Jr & John
A Ferejohn, “Super-Statutes: The New American Constitutionalism” [Eskridge & Ferejohn,
“Super-Statutes”] in Richard W Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds, The Least Examined Branch:
The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2006) 320 at 325; Amy Gutmann, “Foreword: Legislatures in the Constitutional State” in
Richard W Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds, The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures
in the Constitutional State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) ix at xiii; Ran
Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014) at 153.
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quasi-constitutional legislation helps us understand that the Constitution
influences non-constitutional law in ways that go beyond establishing the
boundaries of permissible law-making.14
In analogous fashion, courts in the United Kingdom have struggled over the
past twenty-five years to give meaning to the concept of constitutional legislation.
The UK case law and academic commentary contain important insights for
scholars seeking to understand the significance of quasi-constitutional legislation
in Canadian law. I therefore engage with the British concept of constitutional
legislation to help clarify the meaning of quasi-constitutional legislation in
Canada, though I ultimately conclude that the two types of legislation are distinct.
I begin this article by defending the view that quasi-constitutional legislation
is best understood as legislation that implements constitutional imperatives. In
Part II, I argue that this view is supported by insights derived from comparative
engagement with the concept of constitutional legislation in the United
Kingdom. Part III problematizes the current “trumping” rule that applies when
quasi-constitutional legislation conflicts with ordinary statutes. In Part IV, I
discuss how studying quasi-constitutional legislation reveals new insights about
institutional constitutional implementation. I conclude in Part V.

I. IMPLEMENTING CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES
Canadian courts have not provided much in the way of an overarching theory
of quasi-constitutional statutes, despite applying them with some frequency.
However, it is possible to piece together a basic description of these statutes
through a review of the case law.
A. QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IMPLEMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES

The concept of the quasi-constitutional statute, if not the term, seemed to gain the
approval of a majority of the Court in the 1970 case of The Queen v Drybones.15
There, the majority refused to apply a provision of the Indian Act16 on the
ground that it infringed the accused’s equality rights under the Canadian Bill of
14. Eskridge & Ferejohn, “Super-Statutes,” ibid at 321. For a similar argument, see Mark Elliot,
“Constitutional Legislation, European Union Law and the Nature of the United Kingdom’s
Contemporary Constitution” (2014) 10:3 Eur Const L Rev 379 at 380 [Elliot, “UK’s
Contemporary Constitution”].
15. [1970] SCR 282, 3 CCC 355 [Drybones].
16. RSC 1952, c 149.
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Rights.17 The majority relied on the Bill of Rights’ supremacy clause in reaching its
decision. Although Luc B. Tremblay argues that the same result could have been
reached by applying the doctrine of implied repeal given that the Indian Act was
an earlier statute, the majority’s reasons suggest that something more motivated
its decision.18 In rejecting the argument that the Bill of Rights’ provisions should
be regarded as mere interpretative guidelines, the majority explained that such
an approach would “convert [the Bill of Rights] from its apparent character as
a statutory declaration of the fundamental human rights and freedoms which
it recognizes, into being little more than a rule for the construction of federal
statutes.”19 The fundamentality of the rights recognized thus seemed to do some
work of its own.20
A member of the Court first used the term quasi-constitutional in the
1975 decision of Hogan v The Queen.21 Chief Justice Laskin, writing in dissent,
explained that the Canadian Bill of Rights
is a half-way house between a purely common law regime and a constitutional one; it
may aptly be described as a quasi-constitutional instrument. It does not embody any
sanctions for the enforcement of its terms, but it must be the function of the Courts
to provide them in the light of the judicial view of the impact of that enactment.22

In Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpson-Sears, decided in 1985, the
Court characterized human rights legislation in a similar way, noting that it has a
“special” character that distinguishes it from other legislation:
The accepted rules of construction are flexible enough to enable the Court to
recognize in the construction of a human rights code the special nature and purpose
of the enactment, and give to it an interpretation which will advance its broad
purposes. Legislation of this type is of a special nature, not quite constitutional but
certainly more than the ordinary—and it is for the courts to seek out its purpose
and give it effect.23

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Drybones, supra note 14.
Tremblay, supra note 6 at 89, 104.
Drybones, supra note 15 at 293.
See generally, Sirota, supra note 2.
[1975] 2 SCR 574, 18 CCC (2d) 65.
Ibid at 597-98.
Simpson-Sears, supra note 1 at para 12.
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The Court reached much the same conclusion later that year in Winnipeg School
Division No 1 v Craton.24 In the 1992 decision of Frenette v Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co, a unanimous Court finally adopted the term, noting that the
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms provides “quasi-constitutional
protection” to the right to privacy.25
There is now a short list of statutes that are considered quasi-constitutional.
Some quasi-constitutional statutes, such as the Canadian Bill of Rights and the
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, are statutory bills of rights that
overlap considerably with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.26 They
are quasi-constitutional in the sense that they secure a catalogue of basic rights.
While the Canadian Bill of Rights has largely fallen into disuse, with some notable
exceptions in the context of administrative law,27 the Quebec Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms is often applied alongside the Canadian Charter.28
Other quasi-constitutional statutes implement positive rights conferred by
the Constitution. For example, the federal Official Languages Act29 implements
the executive’s obligations under the official language rights provisions of the

24. [1985] 2 SCR 150, 21 DLR (4th) 1. See Tremblay, supra note 6 at 106; Adam Perry,
“Constitutional and Quasi-Constitutional Statutes,” (24 April 2015), International
Journal of Constitutional Law Blog (blog), online: <www.iconnectblog.com/2015/04/
constitutional-and-quasi-constitutional-statutes>.
25. [1992] 1 SCR 647 at 673, 89 DLR (4th) 653, citing Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,
RSQ c C-12. For an example of how the SCC also employed the term in describing
a planning document, see Old St Boniface Residents’ Association Inc v Winnipeg (City),
[1990] 3 SCR 1170, 75 DLR (4th) 385. I have omitted this reference in the chronology
since in my view it does not reflect the same use of the term as I intend, or the understanding
of the term that has come to prevail.
26. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
27. See generally Lorne Sossin, “The Quasi-Revival of the Canadian Bill of Rights and its
Implications for Administrative Law” (2004) 25 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 191. See also Gus Van
Harten, Gerald Heckman & David Mullan, Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials,
6th ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2010) at 106-07.
28. At least some of the Court’s approach seems to be dictated by the way the applicant frames
the claim. See, e.g., Loyola High School v Quebec (AG), 2015 SCC 12 at para 66, [2015]
1 SCR 613. But see Chaoulli v Quebec (AG), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791. Here
Deschamps J held that the Quebec Charter should be applied in preference to the Canadian
Charter in Quebec.
29. RSC 1985, c 31 [Official Languages Act].
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Charter.30 Like the Charter, the Act states that individuals have the right to use the
official language of their choice in Parliament and in the federal courts,31 as well
as to receive services from the federal government in either English or French.32
As the Federal Court of Appeal explained in Canada (Attorney General) v Viola,33
cited with approval by the SCC in Lavigne:34
The 1988 Official Languages Act is not an ordinary statute. It reflects both the
Constitution of the country and the social and political compromise out of which
it arose. To the extent that it is the exact reflection of the recognition of the official
languages contained in subsections 16(1) and (3) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, it follows the rules of interpretation of that Charter as they have
been defined by the Supreme Court of Canada. To the extent also that it is an
extension of the rights and guarantees recognized in the Charter, and by virtue of
its preamble, its purpose as defined in section 2 and its taking precedence over
other statutes in accordance with subsection 82(1), it belongs to that privileged
category of quasi‑constitutional legislation which reflects “certain basic goals of our
society” and must be so interpreted “as to advance the broad policy considerations
underlying it.”35

The Canada Elections Act might also be characterized as implementing an
affirmative constitutional obligation.36 In Opitz v Wrzesnewskyj, a majority of the
SCC explained that “[t]he Act … sets out detailed procedures for voting that turn
the constitutional right of citizens to vote into a reality on election day.”37 While
the Court has not explicitly characterized the Elections Act as quasi-constitutional,
it has interpreted it in the same generous manner as quasi-constitutional
30. Supra note 25, ss 16-23. I am grateful to Adam Dodek for pointing out to me that
the Official Languages Act was enacted before the Charter entered into force. See
Lavigne v Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53 at para
21, [2002] 2 SCR 773 [Lavigne]; Charlebois v Saint John (City), 2005 SCC 74 at para 13,
[2005] 3 SCR 563. Constitutional obligations ultimately belong to the executive, and must
be implemented in some fashion, legislation being one option. While the legislature is
notionally in charge of enacting legislation, the reality is that the executive usually drives the
legislative process. See Part IV, below.
31. Official Languages Act, supra note 29, ss 4, 14.
32. Some exceptions apply. See Charter, supra note 26, s 20(1); Official Languages Act, supra
note 29, pt IV.
33. [1991] 1 FC 373, 24 ACWS (3d) 189 (FCA) [Viola].
34. Lavigne, supra note 30 at para 23.
35. Viola, supra note 32 at 386.
36. I am grateful to Carissima Mathen for raising the question of whether the Canada Elections
Act fits within my description of quasi-constitutional legislation. See Canada Elections Act,
SC 2000, c 9 [Elections Act]. See also Dodek, supra note 12.
37. 2012 SCC 55 at para 12, [2012] 3 SCR 76 [Opitz].

MacDonnell, A
 Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation 516

legislation.38 Thus, in Opitz, the majority reiterated the following interpretative
guideline first articulated by Justice Cory in a concurring opinion in Haig: “The
courts have always recognized the fundamental importance of the vote and the
necessity to give a broad interpretation to the statutes which provide for it.”39
Some quasi-constitutional statutes implement rights that are not generally
thought to impose affirmative obligations on the state. For example, the federal
Privacy Act40 has been characterized as quasi-constitutional because it secures
aspects of the right to privacy guaranteed by section 8 of the Charter,41 though
the Court has never suggested that section 8 imposes a positive obligation on
political actors to enact legislation that secures individuals’ privacy interests.42
Some quasi-constitutional statutes defy easy classification. Ontario’s
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act43 and the federal Access to
Information Act44 are quasi-constitutional statutes.45 The constitutional right of
access to information was first recognized in 2010 in Ontario (Public Safety and

38. The Canadian Bill of Rights is a notable example of a quasi-constitutional statute that the
courts did not interpret generously. See Berend Hovius, “The Legacy of the Supreme Court
of Canada’s Approach to the Canadian Bill of Rights: Prospects for the Charter” (1982)
28:1 McGill LJ 31; The Constitutional Law Group, Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2010) at 714-17.
39. Haig v Canada; Haig v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] 2 SCR 995 at 1049, 105
DLR (4th) 577 [Haig], Justice Corey cited Cawley v Branchflower (1884), 1 BCR (Pt II)
35 at 37 (SC); Re Lincoln Election (1876), 2 OAR 316 at 323. Justice Cory, citing Cawley v
Branchflower (1884), 1 BCR (Pt II) 35 at 37 (SC) and Re Lincoln Election (1876), 2 OAR
316 at 323. While Justice Cory wrote a concurring opinion in Haig, these guidelines were
endorsed by the majority: see Opitz, supra note 37 at para 37.
40. RSC 1985, c P-21.
41. Lavigne, supra note 30 at para 25. Section 8 of the Charter protects the right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure. See Charter, supra note 26, s 8. The SCC has held
that section 8 “protect[s] a biographical core of personal information which individuals
in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination
to the state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate details of the
lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.” See R v Plant, [1993] 3 SCR 281 at 291-93,
84 CCC (3d) 203.
42. See e.g. Hunter v Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145, 11 DLR (4th) 641.
43. RSO 1990, c F31.
44. RSC 1985, c A-1.
45. This conclusion is implied in Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Commissioner
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2003 SCC 8, [2003] 1 SCR 66. See also Canada
(Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25,
[2011] 2 SCR 306 at para 79, LeBel J.
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Security) v Criminal Lawyers’ Association.46 There, the Court explained that the
right of access to information would be infringed where the government did
not hand over information which “[is] shown to be a necessary precondition
of meaningful expression, does not encroach on protected privileges, and is
compatible with the function of the institution concerned.”47 However, the
Court also emphasized that “there is no general right of access to information.”48
At first glance, then, access to information legislation seems to have more
in common with the Privacy Act than with the Official Languages Act. After all,
it implements a right which the Court frames in negative terms.49 But a right
of access to information necessarily requires political actors to take positive
action.50 Perhaps the Court does not want to be seen to be creating a positive
right of access to information since affirmative constitutional obligations are

46. 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 SCR 815 [CLA]. See also Daniel Guttman, “Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.
v. Ontario: A Limited Right to Government Information under Section 2(b) of the Charter”
(2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 199 [Guttman, “CLA”].
47. CLA, ibid at para 5.
48. Ibid at para 35.
49. This framing is obvious in the Court’s decision in CLA, supra note 45. A similar pattern can
be observed in the Court’s section 2(d), section 7, and section 15 Charter jurisprudence. See
Vanessa MacDonnell & Jula Hughes, “The German Abortion Decisions and the Protective
Function in German and Canadian Constitutional Law” (2013) 50:4 Osgoode Hall
LJ 999; Vanessa MacDonnell, “The Protective Function and Section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2012) 17:1 Rev Const Stud 53 [“MacDonnell, “Protective
Function”]; Mark Tushnet, “State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some
Comparative Observations” (2002) 3:2 Chicago J Int’l L 435 [Tushnet, “State Action”]; Cass
R Sunstein, “State Action Is Always Present” (2002) 3:2 Chicago J Int’l L 465; Anthony
Robert Sangiuliano, “Substantive Equality As Equal Recognition: A New Theory of Section
15 of the Charter” (2015) 52:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 601.
50. Sunstein, ibid at 467; MacDonnell & Hughes, ibid; MacDonnell, “Constitution as
Framework,” supra note 13; Stephen Holmes & Cass R Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why
Liberty Depends on Taxes (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2000) at 52; Keith Ewing,
“The Unbalanced Constitution” in Tom Campbell et al, eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 103 at 115; Debra Parkes, “Baby Steps on the Way
to a Grown-Up Charter: Reflections on 20 Years of Social and Economic Rights Claims”
(2003) 52 UNBLJ 279 at 286; Margot Young, “Section 7 and the Politics of Social Justice”
(2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 539 at 549; Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84 at
para 320, [2002] 4 SCR 429, Arbour J, dissenting [Gosselin].
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highly contested in Canadian constitutional law.51 Whatever the reason for the
Court’s characterization of the right, however, its status as a positive right is
incontrovertible.52 This means that access to information legislation actually has
more in common with the Official Languages Act than the Privacy Act.
Similar challenges present themselves in classifying human rights legislation.
On the one hand, the SCC has been quite clear that positive measures may
sometimes be required to ensure that individuals are treated equally.53 This
suggests that the right to equality imposes affirmative obligations on political
actors. On the other hand, it can be argued that political actors have no obligation
to enact human rights laws.54
B. QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES ARE “FUNDAMENTAL” IN NATURE

One of the themes that runs through the Canadian jurisprudence on
quasi-constitutional statutes is that these laws are “fundamental” in character.55
By invoking fundamental law, the SCC prompts us to think about how
quasi-constitutional statutes are linked to the legal rules, norms, and institutions
that comprise the Constitution. But how do we identify legislation that is “basic
or fundamental enough to count as [quasi-]constitutional”?56
Courts have been judicious in characterizing legislation as
quasi-constitutional. Given that judges must routinely categorize legislation
(i.e., determine whether it is ordinary or quasi-constitutional) to apply the rules
of statutory interpretation, it cannot be said that this is insignificant. Indeed,
it can be inferred that courts understand quasi-constitutional legislation to be
a narrow, if not entirely defined, category. If we examine the category further,
51. See Guttman, “CLA,” supra note 44 at para 49. Guttman states that this view has roots in
the case law and notes that “[i]t is well accepted that section 2(b) generally imposes a
negative obligation on government rather than a positive obligation of protection or
assistance.” He rightly points out, however, that the courts have also acknowledged that in
“exceptional circumstances,” section 2(b) might confer positive rights. See also Haig, supra
note 39 at 1035.
52. MacDonnell & Hughes, ibid.
53. Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385 [Vriend]; R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41
at para 15, [2008] 2 SCR 483.
54. Vriend, Ibid.
55. Drybones, supra note 15; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits
de la jeunesse) v Montreal (City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des
droits de la jeunesse) v Boisbriand (City), 2000 SCC 27 at para 27, [2000] 1 SCR 665;
Sirota, supra note 2.
56. Tarunabh Khaitan, “‘Constitution’ as a Statutory Term” (2013) 129:4 Law Q
Rev 589 at 605-06.
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however, it becomes clear that a great deal of legislation could be characterized
as quasi-constitutional.
Provincial and federal human rights codes are clear examples of fundamental
laws. No one would doubt that these statutes have as their goal the promotion of
equality and the protection of civil liberties. But what about the criminal law, for
example?57 The Charter tends to be invoked in the criminal process to provide the
accused with procedural protections. But it is also possible to view at least some
of the criminal law in a different way: as protecting individuals’ fundamental
constitutional interests, including the interest in being free from physical
violence.58 On this reading, the criminal law secures the interests protected by
section 7 of the Charter, among others.59
If we accept that some sections of the Criminal Code have a fundamental
dimension,60 we might be willing to characterize them as quasi-constitutional.
The same might be said about many other forms of federal law.61 The more we
characterize legislation as quasi-constitutional, however, the more the exceptional
nature of this label is compromised. This poses interpretative challenges. Should
all quasi-constitutional legislation be interpreted generously? Should it always be
given priority over non-fundamental law when the two conflict? I deal with these
questions in the next Part.
C. IMPLEMENTING CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES

In this article I argue that quasi-constitutional legislation is fundamental in the
sense that it implements constitutional imperatives. I use the term “constitutional
imperatives” to refer to constitutional obligations of varying degrees of specificity.
These obligations emanate from the rights-conferring aspects of the Constitution,
as well as from those aspects of the Constitution that establish the institutions
and procedures of government. Following David Feldman, it is my view that
57. Frank Michelman, “The Protective Function of the State in the United States and Europe:
The Constitutional Question” in Georg Nolte, ed, European and US Constitutionalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 156 at 157 [Michelman, “Protective
Function”]; MacDonnell, “Protective Function,” supra note 50 at 73, 80.
58. Michelman, “Protective Function,” ibid. See also MacDonnell, “Protective Function,” ibid.
59. Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at paras 64, 68, [2015] 1 SCR 331;
Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 at para 55,
[2000] 2 SCR 307.
60. See generally Benjamin Berger, “Constitutional Principles in Substantive Criminal Law”
in Markus D Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle, eds, Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014) 422.
61. Kumm, supra note 11 at 115.

MacDonnell, A
 Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation 520

quasi-constitutional legislation can include delegated legislation where such
legislation implements constitutional imperatives.62 Following Feldman,63 Mark
Elliot,64 and the Supreme Court Act Reference,65 it may be more useful to think of
individual provisions as having this status as opposed to a statute or regulation
in its entirety.
As should be apparent, this definition of quasi-constitutional legislation is
broad. It may render the concept too broad to be of great use as an interpretative
principle. It does not, however, render it meaningless or “trivial[].”66 On the
contrary, this definition sheds light on a significant amount of previously
unrecognized quasi-constitutional law.67
What is the justification for adopting this definition of quasi-constitutional
legislation? The Court’s characterization of quasi-constitutional legislation
as fundamental suggests that some legislation is shaped by and embodies
constitutional norms and imperatives. This is different from the usual assertion
that all legislation must be constitutionally compliant to be valid. It suggests, in
short, that statutes play a role in implementing constitutional imperatives, either
because governments must implement these imperatives or because it is merely a
good idea or good policy.
Here it is useful to refer to German constitutional theory, which suggests that
constitutional rights have different “dimensions.”68 In addition to their “negative”
or “subjective” dimension,69 which tends to be the focus of most constitutional

62. David Feldman, “The Nature and Significance of ‘Constitutional’ Legislation” (2013) 129:3
Law Q Rev 343 at 344.
63. Ibid at 352-53.
64. Elliot, “UK’s Contemporary Constitution,” supra note 14 at 386.
65. Reference Re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 433 [Supreme Court
Act Reference].
66. Frank Michelman, “Residual Liberty and Constitutional Comparison” (2009) [unpublished]
at 25, citing Riding in the Woods (1989), BVerfGE 80, 137 (Germany), Grimm J, dissenting
[on file with author]. I will use this term throughout.
67. Eskridge & Ferejohn “Super-Statutes,” supra note 13 at 336-39.
68. Dieter Grimm, “The Protective Function of the State” in Georg Nolte, ed, European and US
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005) 137 at 142.
69. Ibid at 144.
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scholarship, constitutional rights also serve as “an objective order of values.”70
In this capacity, they influence all aspects of lawmaking.71 In Dolphin Delivery,72
the SCC recognized that Charter rights serve a similar function. There, the
Court’s focus was on how the Charter influences the common law, but the
Court’s reasoning can easily be applied to the legislative process.73 After all, the
constitutional values must have implications for governance and public policy.74
I do not mean to suggest that all or even most legislation is the product
of a process by which the executive assesses its constitutional obligations and
takes steps to implement those obligations “proactive[ly].”75 This is likely the
case with at least some legislation, however. Many other laws could be said to
have constitutional dimensions, even if the process by which they came into
being was not the product of a conscious decision by the executive to advance a
rights-based policy agenda.
Feldman, writing in the UK context, acknowledges that a significant volume
of legislation—or at least legislative provisions76—could be characterized as
70. Donald P Kommers & Russell A Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal
Republic of Germany (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012) at 442, translating Lüth
(1958), BVerfGE 7, 198 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany) [Lüth]. See also Robert Alexy, A Theory
of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 391; Sandra Fredman,
Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008) [Fredman, Human Rights Transformed]. Eskridge and Ferejohn present a similar
version of this argument as the “Aristotelian perspective” on constitutions. See Eskridge &
Ferejohn, “Super-Statutes,” supra note 13 at 329. They write:
Rather than expressing a set of positive rules negotiated by long-deceased framers,
the central metaphor of a large C Constitution as social contract, the Aristotelian
small c constitution embodies fundamental values to which our polity is or ought to be
committed. And constitutionalism is reasoning from those values to address new problems
confronted by the nation.

71. Lüth, ibid; MacDonnell & Hughes, supra note 50 at 1009.
72. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v Dolphin Delivery Ltd,
[1986] 2 SCR 573 at para 25, 33 DLR (4th) 174 [Dolphin Delivery].
73. Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role? (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2001) at 8-9.
74. Vanessa MacDonnell, “The Civil Servant’s Role in the Implementation of Constitutional
Rights” (2015) 13:2 Int’l J Const L 383 [MacDonnell, “Civil Servant’s Role”].
75. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed, supra note 70; Sandra Fredman, “Breaking the Mold:
Equality as a Proactive Duty” (2012) 60 Am J Comp L 265 [Fredman, “Breaking the
Mold”]; Gillian MacNaughton & Paul Hunt, “A Human Rights-Based Approach to Social
Impact Assessment” in Frank Vanclay & Ana Maria Esteves, eds, New Directions In Social
Impact Assessment: Conceptual and Methodological Advances (Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar, 2012) at 360.
76. Feldman, supra note 62 at 353.
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fundamental,77 though he would reject the view that constitutional legislation in
the United Kingdom includes legislation that implements basic rights. One of
the reasons why Feldman is reluctant to confer constitutional status on legislation
that secures basic rights is that “the category of fundamental rights is not closed.”78
My approach to quasi-constitutional legislation accommodates the possibility of
changes in our understanding of the scope and content of constitutional rights.
While the rights contained in the Charter may be regarded as relatively fixed, the
content of quasi-constitutional legislation is by no means so. On the contrary, the
content of this type of legislation could be expected to change over time. This is
consistent with the living tree conception of Canadian constitutionalism.79
To summarize, when we talk about the influence of constitutional law—
and, specifically, charters of rights—on legislation, we need to think beyond
rights infringement. Charters of rights do not simply demarcate the permissible
boundaries of lawmaking.80 They also guide lawmakers in elaborating the content
of government policy.81 In other words, legislation reflects fundamental rights,
whether consciously or unconsciously, and to varying degrees of sufficiency.
D. THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN THIS THEORY

At this point, it should be noted that fundamental rights are only part of the story.
While the Court’s approach to quasi-constitutional statutes has been decidedly
rights-based, it has nevertheless recognized that statutes that set out the structures
of institutions or procedures can also have constitutional dimensions. In Ontario
(Attorney General) v OPSEU,82 for example, civil servants who wished to play an
active role in an upcoming federal election challenged provisions of Ontario’s
Public Service Act83 on federalism grounds. The Act placed strict limits on public
servants’ political involvement. The majority had no trouble concluding that
the impugned provisions were a valid exercise of provincial power. Unlike the
trial court and the Court of Appeal, however, a majority of the SCC held that
77. Ibid at 352.
78. Ibid at 345-46. See also Eskridge & Ferejohn, “Super-Statutes,” supra note 13 at 8-9.
79. Edwards v Canada (Attorney General), [1930] AC 124, 1929 UKPC 86; Richard Albert,
“Nonconstitutional Amendments” (2009) 22:1 Can JL & Jur 5 at 16-19. See also Hugo Cyr,
Canadian Federalism and Treaty Powers: Organic Constitutionalism at Work (Brussels, New
York: PIE Peter Lang, 2009) at 222.
80. MacDonnell, “Constitution as Framework,” supra note 13 at 628-30; MacDonnell, “Civil
Servant’s Role,” supra note 74.
81. Lüth, supra note 70; Dolphin Delivery, supra note 72 at paras 29-30.
82. [1987] 2 SCR 2, 59 OR (2d) 671 [OPSEU].
83. RSO 1970, c 386.
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the Act was “an amendment of the constitution of the province” within the
meaning of section 92(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and “related to the tenure
of provincial officers” within the meaning of section 92(4), rather than labour
legislation enacted under the province’s jurisdiction over property and civil rights
in the province under section 92(13).84
The majority explained that a law would be considered a constitutional
amendment for section 92(1) purposes “when it bears on the operation of an
organ of the government of the province”;85 that is, where it “determine[s] the
composition, powers, authority, privileges and duties of the legislative or of the
executive branches or their members”; “regulate[s] the interrelationship between
two or more branches”; or “set[s] out some principle of government.”86 Since
the Public Service Act implemented the principle of responsible government, of
which public service neutrality is an essential component, the legislation was
properly characterized as an amendment to the Constitution of the Province.
In reaching its decision, the majority noted that Ontario’s Constitution “is
partly contained in a variety of statutory provisions. Some of these provisions
have been enacted by the Parliament at Westminster,” while “[o]ther provisions
relating to constitution of Ontario have been enacted by ordinary statutes of the
Legislature of Ontario.”87 With these words, the majority affirmed that ordinary
laws can have constitutional dimensions, though the wider significance of its
pronouncement was unclear. It remained to be seen, for example, how the Court
would characterize federal legislation that “bears on the operation of an organ of
the government.”88
The recent Supreme Court Act Reference dealt with a related set of questions.89
The reference was prompted by an application for judicial review of the
appointment of Marc Nadon, a justice of the Federal Court of Appeal, to one
of the three reserved Quebec seats on the SCC. The applicant argued that to be
eligible for the appointment, the Supreme Court Act required that Nadon either
84. OPSEU, supra note 82 at paras 61, 81. Section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides
that, “Subject to section 41, the legislature of each province may exclusively make laws
amending the constitution of the province.” Section 92(1) was repealed in 1982. See
Constitution Act, 1982, s 45, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
85. OPSEU, ibid at para 90.
86. Ibid at para 77. The majority added that such legislation could not be “otherwise
entrenched as being indivisibly related to the implementation of the federal principle or to a
fundamental term or condition of the union” or “explicitly or implicitly excepted from the
amending power bestowed upon the province by s 92(1).” Ibid.
87. Ibid at para 74.
88. Ibid at para 90.
89. Supra note 63.
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be a judge of a superior court of Quebec or a current member of the Quebec bar
for at least ten years. Since he satisfied neither of those conditions, it was argued,
he should not have been appointed.
The federal government took two actions in response to the judicial review
application. First, it sought to resolve any interpretative ambiguity by introducing
declaratory legislation affirming that both current and former members of the
Quebec bar for at least ten years were eligible for appointment,90 and second,
it initiated a reference to the SCC. The Reference posed two questions: First,
was the interpretation of the Supreme Court Act advanced in the application for
judicial review correct? And second, was it within Parliament’s competence to
enact the declaratory legislation?
The majority relied on a series of historical developments, up to and including
the patriation of the Constitution and the creation of a domestic amending
formula, to conclude that the SCC has “constitutional status.”91 It elaborated:
Essential features of the Court are constitutionally protected under Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982. Changes to the composition of the Court can only be made
under the procedure provided for in s. 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and therefore
require the unanimous consent of Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
Changes to the other essential features of the Court can only be made under the
procedure provided for in s. 42 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which requires the
consent of at least seven provinces representing, in the aggregate, at least half of the
population of all the provinces.92

Thus, both OPSEU and the Supreme Court Act Reference suggest that legislation
that sets out the precise features of institutions is constitutionally significant. In
OPSEU, the Court explained that provincial laws of this nature form part of the
Constitution of the Province.93 In the Supreme Court Act Reference, the Court
held that the amendment rules set out in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982
might be triggered where the government sought to make changes to statutory
features of the state’s central institutions—here, the SCC.94

90. Economic Action Plan 2013 Act No 2, SC 2013, c 40, ss 471-72.
91. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 65 at para 76.
92. Ibid at para 74. Justice Moldaver, who dissented, expressed agreement with the majority that
changing Quebec’s number of seats on the court would engage the s 41 amending formula.
93. OPSEU, supra note 82 at para 135.
94. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 65. See also Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32,
[2014] 1 SCR 704; Dodek, supra note 12.
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E.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL AND QUASICONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION

In an important sense, the statutes described in OPSEU and the Supreme
Court Act Reference differ from the statutes the SCC has characterized as
quasi-constitutional. While both sets of statutes share the fact of being influenced
by the Constitution, the former contain provisions that have actually been held
to be constitutional in nature.95 Thus, in the Supreme Court Act Reference, the
majority explained that sections 5 and 6 of the Act, which together set out the
pre-requisites for appointment to one of the Quebec seats on the SCC, could
only be altered by formal constitutional amendment.96 In doing so, the Court
confirmed that sections 5 and 6 form part of the Constitution of Canada, or, in
the Court’s words, are “constitutionally protected.”97
The amending formula refers explicitly to institutions—including the SCC—
whose features are elaborated in ordinary statutes. There are also institutions
which are not referred to explicitly but which are subject to the general amending
formula.98 Once the central features of these institutions were settled (a fact
that can now be taken as a given in many cases), subsequent changes would be
considered constitutional amendments.
This is not true of quasi-constitutional legislation. For example, while the
Canadian Human Rights Act might be said to implement the right to equality,
changes to or even the abolition of the Act would not trigger the amending
formula. This is because the Canadian Human Rights Act is not part of the
Constitution. Whether such changes would be consistent with the Charter right
to equality would be a different question,99 but no one would suggest that the
government was seeking to amend part of the Constitution by amending the
Canadian Human Rights Act. It would appear, then, that there are actually two
categories of legislation with constitutional dimensions in Canada: legislation
that is part of the Constitution, like the provisions of the Supreme Court Act at
issue in the Reference, and quasi-constitutional legislation, like some provisions
of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The distinction between the two turns on
95. I am grateful to Peter Oliver for helping me to work this out.
96. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 65. The Court was unanimous in characterizing s 6
as constitutional.
97. Ibid at para 19.
98. Dodek, supra note 12.
99. See Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44,
[2011] 3 SCR 134; Vriend, supra note 53; Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General),
[1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577.
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whether the legislation forms part of the Constitution or simply implements a
constitutional imperative.
It is conceivable that a change to a peripheral provision of the Supreme
Court Act would not engage the amending formula but should still be
characterized as implementing a constitutional imperative.100 Such a provision
would be quasi-constitutional under the theory I propose. Thus, individual
provisions of laws that implement institutional and procedural elements of the
Constitution might be characterized as either: (1) part of the Constitution, (2)
quasi-constitutional, or (3) ordinary.
As a general matter, it is less difficult to make the case for recognizing
institutional or procedural provisions as quasi-constitutional. Institutions that are
referenced or implied in the Constitution must be designed and given the tools
necessary for their functioning.101 Now, the degree to which the Constitution
prescribes the features of any given institution is another question entirely. I am
inclined to believe, as a preliminary view, that the Constitution has relatively little
to say about the features of any individual institution of government, especially
where the obligation to create that institution is merely implied, though the
level of prescription found in the constitutional text is obviously an important
consideration.102
F.

AN ADDITIONAL REFINEMENT TO THE THEORY OF QUASICONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION

At this stage, it is necessary to further refine the theory of quasi-constitutional
legislation I set out in this article. Tremblay usefully explains that
quasi-constitutional statutes come in two forms; in fact, he would refer to only
one as quasi-constitutional. Some statutes, he says, are quasi-constitutional by
virtue of their containing an express trumping provision. According to this
“orthodox position,”

100. Reference re Senate Reform, supra note 94. See also Dodek, supra note 12; Kate Glover,
“Structure, Substance and Spirit: Lessons in Constitutional Architecture from the Senate
Reform Reference” (2014) 67 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 221.
101. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed, supra note 70 at 69. See also Holmes & Sunstein,
supra note 51; Sunstein, supra note 50 at 467; Jamie Cameron, “Positive Obligations under
Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter: A Comment on Gosselin v Quebec” (2003) 20 Sup Ct
L Rev (2d) 65 at 71; Ewing, supra note 51 at 115; Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser,
2011 SCC 20 at para 72, [2011] 2 SCR 3; Gosselin, supra note 51 at para 320,
Arbour J, dissenting.
102. Khaitan, supra note 56.
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Characterizing … statutes as “quasi-constitutional” has nothing to do with the
importance of their content, be they in relation to fundamental rights and freedoms
or in relation to speed limits. The characterization is merely based on the fact that
it is intended that the statute have supremacy over all other inconsistent ordinary
enactments that do not fulfil the required conditions.103

Other statutes, which he refers to as “special nature legislation,”104 do not
contain trumping provisions, but the courts have nevertheless treated them as
quasi-constitutional. The first category of statutes would include the Canadian
Bill of Rights, while the second would include human rights statutes.105
Tremblay ultimately concludes that the mere presence of a trumping provision
should not be sufficient to render a statue quasi-constitutional.106 This raises the
question of how my theory would characterize statutes that do not, on their face,
appear to implement any constitutional imperative, but which contain the telltale
trumping provision. Tremblay identifies entrenchment as the major quality that
renders the first set of statutes quasi-constitutional on the orthodox view.107 I
prefer Farrah Ahmed and Adam Perry’s use of the term “quasi-entrenched” in
the UK context.108 I would suggest that quasi-entrenchment is not sufficient to
establish that legislation is quasi-constitutional. Rather, the legislation must also
implement a constitutional imperative. It is by virtue of the application of this
second requirement that fundamentality is assured.
The preceding discussion suggests that quasi-constitutional legislation is
not well understood in Canada. This is surprising, given that the concept has
been part of Canadian law for more than 40 years. It seems clear that whatever
the meaning of this concept, it is not a simple or monolithic one. In the next
Part, I ask what additional insights about quasi-constitutional legislation might
be gained by examining how the concept of “constitutional legislation” has
developed in the United Kingdom.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Tremblay, supra note 6 at 88. See also ibid at 266, n 189.
Ibid at 104.
Ibid at 88, 104.
Ibid at 266, n 189.
Ibid at 88.
Farrah Ahmed & Adam Perry, “The Quasi-Entrenchment of Constitutional Statutes” (2014)
73:3 Cambridge LJ 514.
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II. “CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION” IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
In the past few decades, UK courts have similarly struggled to articulate the
relationship between legislation and the UK Constitution. The issues in the
UK context are not identical, both because of the stronger historic pull of
parliamentary sovereignty and because the UK Constitution is uncodified.109
Nevertheless, examining the evolution of the UK jurisprudence on constitutional
legislation sheds light on where legislation fits within the larger constitutional
matrix. In this Part, I trace the trajectory of the jurisprudence on constitutional
legislation and examine the scholarly literature which has emerged in response
to the case law.
The first discussion of constitutional legislation in the United Kingdom
appeared in the early 2000s in a case called Thoburn.110 In Thoburn, the
Administrative Court was asked to determine the validity of the Units of
Measurement Regulations 1994, delegated legislation promulgated to gradually
phase out the use of imperial measures in the United Kingdom, in compliance
with EU law.111 The Regulations were promulgated on the authority of the
European Communities Act 1972,112 which incorporates European Union law
into UK law. The Regulations amended the Weights and Measures Act 1985,113
which permitted the exclusive use of imperial measures in the sale of loose
goods. The question for the Administrative Court was whether the Weights and
Measures Act 1985, which was enacted after the ECA, had impliedly repealed the
section of the ECA that authorized the promulgation of the Regulations, thereby
rendering them invalid.114
Lord Justice Laws concluded that “there is no inconsistency” between the
relevant provisions of the ECA and the Weights and Measures Act 1985.115 He
then went on to deal, in obiter dicta,116 with the argument that the ECA could
not be impliedly repealed. Normally, a subsequent inconsistent enactment would
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Elliot, “UK’s Contemporary Constitution,” supra note 14.
Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB 151 [Thoburn].
SI 1994/2866.
(UK), c 68 [ECA].
(UK), c 72.
Thoburn, supra note 110 at para 43.
Ibid at para 48.
Ahmed & Perry, supra note 108 at 516; Khaitan, supra note 56 at 593; Mark Elliot,
“Embracing ‘Constitutional’ Legislation: Towards Fundamental Law?” (2003) 54:1 N Ir
Legal Q 25 at 27 [Elliot, “Towards Fundamental Law?”].
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be taken to have impliedly repealed the earlier enactment. But the ECA, Lord
Justice Laws noted, is a “constitutional statute.”117 A constitutional statute, he
explained, “is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen
and state in some general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes
the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental constitutional rights.”118
Relying in part on the House of Lords’ decisions in Factortame No 1119 and
Factortame No 2,120 he found that constitutional statutes could only be repealed
where it could be “shown that the legislature’s actual—not imputed, constructive,
or presumed—intention was to effect the repeal or abrogation.”121 He went on
to say that “the test could only be met by express words in the later statute, or by
words so specific that the inference of an actual determination to effect the result
contended for was irresistible.”122
Regarding Factortame No 1, Lord Justice Laws explained that “the House
of Lords effectively accepted that s. 2(4) [of the ECA] could not be impliedly
repealed, albeit the point was not argued.”123 In Factortame No 2, the House of
Lords dealt with the issue more explicitly, with Lord Bridge of Harwich stating:
If the supremacy within the European Community of Community law over the
national law of member states was not always inherent in the E.E.C. Treaty it was
certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice long
before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitations of
its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act
1972 was entirely voluntary.124

In the 2012 case of H v Lord Advocate,125 the UK Supreme Court held (also
in obiter) that the Scottish devolution statute could only be expressly repealed,
owing to what Lord Hope called the “fundamental constitutional nature of the
settlement that was achieved by the Scotland Act.”126 Ahmed and Perry point out
117. Thoburn, supra note 110 at para 62.
118. Ibid.
119. R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, [1989] UKHL 1, [1990] 2 AC 85
[Factortame No 1].
120. R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport (No 2), [1990] UKHL 13, [1991] AC 603
[Factortame No 2].
121. Thoburn, supra note 110 at para 63.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid at para 61.
124. Factortame No 2, supra note 120 at 658-59, cited in Thoburn, supra note 110 at para 65.
See also Ahmed & Perry, supra note 108 at 515-16; Elliot, “Towards Fundamental Law?”
supra note 115.
125. H v Lord Advocate, [2012] UKSC 24, [2013] 1 AC 413].
126. Ibid at para 30. See also Ahmed & Perry, supra note 108 at 515.
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that this is a higher standard than Lord Justice Laws articulated in Thoburn.127
Perry suggests that “[t]he Supreme Court may now be having second thoughts”
about H v Lord Advocate. “In HS2,” the case to which I now turn, “the Court
cited Thoburn approvingly, but did not mention its decision in H.”128
HS2129 is the most recent word from the UK Supreme Court on constitutional
legislation. It is also the first case in which the court discusses Thoburn.130 HS2
involved a challenge to a high-speed rail line, HS2, that is being built in the
United Kingdom. The government sought development approval for the project
through the legislative process—specifically, using two “hybrid” bills.131 Groups
opposed to the line’s proposed route brought an application for judicial review
arguing that the government had not complied with EU environmental impact
assessment requirements at the planning stage for the line. They also argued that
the hybrid bill process did not satisfy the consultation requirements mandated by
EU law for these types of projects.
In addressing the second issue, Lords Neuberger and Mance, with whom the
remaining Lords concurred, noted that it is a long-established principle of British
constitutional law, enshrined in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, that courts
are “preclude[d]” from “impeaching or questioning … debates or proceedings
of Parliament.”132 The appellants, Lords Neuberger and Mance explained, were
urging the court to interpret EU law in a manner that would require precisely
this type of inquiry. Such an interpretation would create a potential “conflict”
between two “constitutional instruments,”133 the Bill of Rights 1689 and the ECA
(the latter of which incorporates EU law into domestic law). The Lords rejected
this interpretation of the relevant EU directive.134 They noted, however, that if
such a conflict were to be put squarely before the court in a future case, the

127. Ibid at 520.
128. Perry, supra note 24.
129. R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, [2014] UKSC 3, [2014]
PTSR 182 [HS2].
130. Elliot, “UK’s Contemporary Constitution,” supra note 14 at 384.
131. As Lord Reed explained in HS2, “[A] hybrid bill proceeds as a public bill, with a second
reading, committee report and third reading, but with an additional select committee stage
after the second reading in each House, at which objectors whose interests are directly and
specifically affected by the bill (including local authorities) may petition against the bill
and be heard.” See HS2, supra note 129 at para 57. See also Elliot, “UK’s Contemporary
Constitution,” supra note 14 at 382.
132. HS2, ibid at para 203.
133. Ibid at para 208.
134. Ibid at para 209.
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ECA would not automatically trump by virtue of its being enacted after the Bill
of Rights 1689:
It is, putting the point at its lowest, certainly arguable (and it is for United Kingdom
law and courts to determine) that there may be fundamental principles, whether
contained in other constitutional instruments or recognized at common law, of
which Parliament when it enacted the European Communities Act 1982 did not
either contemplate or authorize the abrogation.135

Lords Neuberger and Mance then made a number of additional points about
constitutional instruments. They designated a list of constitutional instruments,
“including” the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right 1689, the Act of Settlement
1701, the Act of Union 1707, the ECA, the Human Rights Act 1998, and the
Constitutional Reform Act 2005.136 They noted that “[t]he common law itself also
recognises certain principles as fundamental to the rule of law.”137 And, for the
first time, they acknowledged Lord Justice Laws’s discussion of constitutional
legislation in Thoburn, describing it as “penetrating.”138
In a separate line of cases on devolution, the House of Lords and UK Supreme
Court have dealt with the question of how constitutional statutes should be
interpreted.139 As Tarunabh Khaitan explains, the interpretative consequences
of characterizing legislation as constitutional have not been straightforward.140
In the 2002 decision of the House of Lords in Robinson v Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland and Ors,141 Lord Bingham of Cornhill stated that a statute
devolving powers to Northern Ireland “should be interpreted consistently with
the language used, be interpreted generously and purposively, bearing in mind

135.
136.
137.
138.

Ibid at para 207.
Ibid. Their use of the word “including” suggests this list is not exhaustive.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 208. See also Elliot, “UK’s Contemporary Constitution,” supra note 14 at 385.
Elliot explains that the Lords “signalled a degree of approval ofwhilst stopping short of
straightforwardly adoptingthe judgment of Laws LJ in Thoburn.” See also Paul Craig,
“Constitutionalising Constitutional Law: HS2” (2014) 3 PL 373.
139. For a useful discussion of these cases, see Khaitan, supra note 56. Devolution involves the
transfer of powers by statute to Scotland, Northern Ireland, or Wales.
140. Ibid.
141. [2002] UKHL 32, [2002] NI 390 [Robinson].
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the values which the constitutional provisions are intended to embody.”142 In
the subsequent case of Imperial Tobacco Ltd v The Lord Advocate (Scotland),143
however, the UK Supreme Court was unanimous in expressing scepticism about
the need for special rules in interpreting the Scotland Act 1998, which devolves
powers to Scotland. Lord Hope stated that the Act “must be interpreted in the
same way as any other rules that are found in a UK statute,” and that it should
be “construed according to the ordinary meaning of the words used.”144 He also
stated, however, that the Act “was intended, within carefully defined limits, to be
a generous settlement of legislative authority.”145
The problem with Lord Bingham’s statement in Robinson, Khaitan explains,
is that he “uses ‘generous’ and ‘purposive’ approaches in the same breath, as if they
were always compatible, if not interchangeable. However, they can sometimes
pull in different directions.”146 It is also significant, he notes, that the court
in Imperial Tobacco did not cite Robinson.147 Khaitan suggests that the subject
matter of the legislation can be used as a guide to interpretation: “One could say
that a generous interpretative approach is appropriate for provisions which are
framed in a general and vague language, or which embody broad legal principles
normally found in preambles to constitutions and Bills of Rights.”148 The stricter
mode of interpretation might be used where the court is construing “provisions
in a constitutional statute which embody a detailed rule where the scope for
indeterminacy is minimal.”149 “Both approaches,” he notes, “are ‘purposive.’”150
The fact that these rules of interpretation have been carved out in the
devolution context may explain some of the double-speak that appears in the
decisions. Devolution cases involve statutes that distribute powers between
142. Ibid at para 11. Khaitan suggests that the UK Supreme Court “endors[ed] this approach” in
the 2011 decision in AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate, [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC
868. In that case, the court noted that “the carefully chosen language in which [certain
provisions of the Scotland Act] are expressed is not as important as the general message
that the words convey. The Scottish Parliament takes its place under our constitutional
arrangements as a self-standing democratically elected legislature.” See Khaitan, supra
note 56 at 595.
143. [2012] UKSC 61, 2013 SCLR 121 [Imperial Tobacco]. See also Khaitan, ibid at 594-95.
144. Imperial Tobacco, ibid at para 14. See also Stephen J Dimelow, “The Interpretation of
‘Constitutional’ Statutes” (2013) 129:4 Law Q Rev 498 at 499; Perry, supra note 24.
145. Imperial Tobacco, ibid at para 15.
146. Khatian, supra note 56 at 594.
147. Ibid at 595.
148. Ibid at 596.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid.
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governments rather than confer individual rights. It is difficult to know what it
would mean to interpret such a statute generously, other than perhaps in favour
of the government to whom powers are being devolved. In these cases, moreover,
it is evident that the Lords were driven by a desire to keep the underlying
political compact intact.151 Adam Tomkins refers to Robinson as “an extraordinary
decision, in which by the narrowest of margins a majority of the law lords ruled
that an unlawful election was lawful, in order to keep Northern Irish devolution
afloat and so as to prevent the DUP and Sinn Fein from obtaining office.”152 He
explains that given that Robinson “has not been followed in subsequent [UK]
Supreme Court case law[,] … it is perhaps best understood as having been
confined to its facts.”153
In sum, then, labelling legislation as constitutional means that the usual
rules of implied repeal do not apply. Constitutional legislation may or may not
be interpreted generously. This is not entirely out of step with Canadian law. In
Lavigne, the SCC explained that
[t]he Official Languages Act and the Privacy Act are closely linked to the values and
rights set out in the Constitution, and this explains the quasi-constitutional status
that this Court has recognized them as having. However, that status does not operate
to alter the traditional approach to the interpretation of legislation … [whereby]
“the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical
and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act,
and the intention of Parliament.”154

151. For Canadian examples of this phenomenon, see ||Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the
Education Act (Ont)||, [1987] 1 SCR 1148, 40 DLR (4th) 18 [Reference re Bill 30 cited to
SCR]. See also Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609, 252 DLR (4th) 10 at para 29. Justice
Iacobucci explains for the majority in ||Adler|| that “Section 93 [which preserves the rights of
denominational schools in Quebec and Ontario] is the product of an historical compromise
which was a crucial step along the road leading to Confederation.” This meant that the
rights created by section 93 could not be the subject of an equality challenge under section
15 of the Charter, even though the provisions may “sit uncomfortably with the concept of
equality embodied in the Charter.” See ibid at para 38, Iacobucci J, citing Reference re Bill 30,
supra note 150 at 1197. See also SM Corbett, “Adler v. Ontario: The Troubling History of a
Compromise” (1997) 8:3 Const Forum Const 64 at 65.
152. Adam Tomkins, “Confusion and Retreat: The Supreme Court of Devolution,” (17 February
2015), British Government and the Constitution (blog), online: <www.britgovcon.
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(Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87.
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As in the UK context, Canadian courts often refer to the relevant approach to
interpretation as being as generous and purposive one, which as Khaitan points
out is not always particularly helpful.155
What are the limits of the British account, for our purposes? One significant
limit is that the statutes at issue in these cases do not implement a priori
constitutional imperatives so much as they are a part of the uncodified British
Constitution. In this respect, the truest analogy is between British constitutional
statutes and Canadian legislation like the Supreme Court Act, some provisions
of which have been deemed constitutional by the SCC. But this does not
mean that the British cases and commentary are unhelpful when it comes to
studying quasi-constitutional legislation in Canada. On the contrary, many
of the classification and interpretation questions raised by these two types of
legislation overlap.
It is unquestionable that some of the wrangling over the meaning of
constitutional legislation in the United Kingdom stems from the fact that it
is not possible to point to a single, codified constitutional document.156 But
this fact does not make the UK Constitution so different from its Canadian
counterpart. Both the UK and Canadian constitutions contain important written
and unwritten elements. More to the point, legislation is an important source of
fundamental law in both countries. The fact that the Canadian Constitution is
anchored in a few key written documents has obscured the need to clarify or
conceptualize the role of legislation in Canadian constitutional law, but such a
need still exists. The presence of a written constitution should not be understood
as relieving courts and scholars of the task of articulating the place of legislation
in the broader constitutional framework.157
The UK jurisprudence and secondary literature demonstrates that it can
be challenging to define the boundaries of constitutional legislation.158 Lord
Justice Laws would define constitutional legislation to include instruments that
“(a) condition[] the legal relationship between citizen and state in some general,
overarching manner, or (b) enlarge[] or diminish[] the scope of what we would now

155. Supra note 56 at 594; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la
jeunesse) v Montréal (City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la
jeunesse) v Boisbriand (City), supra note 55; Thibodeau, supra note 5; Sullivan, supra note 5.
156. Elliot, “UK’s Contemporary Constitution,” supra note 14 at 386.
157. For some useful thinking on this subject in the context of the amending formula, see Dodek,
supra note 12; Glover, supra note 100.
158. Elliot, “UK’s Contemporary Constitution,” supra note 14 at 386; Feldman, supra note 62 at
356; Craig, supra note 138.
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regard as fundamental constitutional rights.”159 Feldman critiques Lord Justice
Laws’s definition on the grounds that it is “both over- and under-inclusive.”160
It is under-inclusive, he argues, because it fails to include legislation that creates
institutions.161 Moreover, by including legislation that secures rights, he argues,
Lord Justice Laws’s definition of constitutional legislation is over-inclusive. In
Feldman’s view, only this “secondary” or “framework” legislation should qualify
as constitutional.162
Even if we can agree on general criteria for identifying quasi-constitutional
or constitutional legislation, Khaitan raises a further set of concerns. “The first
problem,” he explains,
is to determine with some certainty which institutions of the state are basic or
fundamental enough to count as constitutional. … Parliament has characterised
the monarchy, Parliament and aspects of the judiciary as constitutional. But are the
army, civil service, the Court of Appeals, the Bank of England, city councils, Mayors
etc. also constitutional institutions? How can we tell?163

Similar issues arise, he says, in sorting out how far such recognition extends.
Even if we agree that a particular institution is constitutional, how do we
determine where its constitutional aspects stop and its non-constitutional aspects
begin?164 These are questions Canadian scholars will need to sort out in defining
both quasi-constitutional and constitutional legislation.

III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE TRUMPING RULE
At this stage, something more should be said about the interpretive quandary
posed by the fact that, under the theory I propose, quasi-constitutional legislation
is much more prevalent than the SCC has acknowledged. In this Part, I consider
whether there is simply too much quasi-constitutional legislation to accommodate
a trumping rulethat is, a rule that provides that quasi-constitutional legislation
prevails over ordinary law in the event of a conflict. I also deal with the concern
that if we were to interpret all quasi-constitutional legislation in a large and liberal
manner, a great deal of legislation would be read this way.
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The UK literature is helpful on the latter point. Khaitan notes that UK courts
have struggled to articulate a single set of rules for interpreting constitutional
legislation, though they have consistently interpreted constitutional legislation
purposively.165 While it might make sense to read legislation that implements
individual rights in a “large and liberal” manner, it is less logical to read
legislation that implements the institutional and procedural dimensions of the
Constitution in this manner.166 The Canadian Interpretation Act167 suggests that
remedial legislation should be read in a “large and liberal manner.”168 This lends
support to the argument that only rights-implementing legislation should be
construed generously.
The issue with the trumping rule cannot be so easily resolved. As it now
stands, quasi-constitutional statutes simply prevail over other, ordinary laws.
But such a trumping rule could not easily be applied if quasi-constitutional
legislation is understood in the manner I propose. Not only would a great deal of
legislation be interpreted in this manner, but provisions in quasi-constitutional
legislation might frequently come into conflict with one another.169 Some rule
would be required to resolve the problem that would arise when two pieces of
quasi-constitutional legislation conflicted.
In HS2, Lords Neuberger and Mance commented, in obiter, about the issues
that present themselves when two pieces of constitutional legislation come into
conflict. They explained that if the ECA were to conflict with the Bill of Rights
1689, the Court would not assume that the ECA had impliedly repealed the Bill
of Rights 1689. This demonstrates that the Lords were conscious of the need to
give more thought to the matter before applying the implied repeal rule. Elliot
suggests that conflicts between constitutional legislation could “be resolved
by reference to their respective fundamentality.”170 Statutes deemed “equally
fundamental,” he says, would require an additional rule.171
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In my view, it would be very difficult for courts to design a satisfactory
approach to determining “respective fundamentality.”172 This does not mean,
however, that they could not attempt to interpret the statutes in a manner that
avoided a conflict, where possible.173 This approach to interpretation might
offer a partial solution to the concerns raised by conflicting quasi-constitutional
legislation. Moreover, it may be that there would be fewer conflicts in practice than
there are in theory. Where the issue could not be resolved through interpretation,
the best approach would be to adopt the implied repeal rule and to leave it to
politicians to deal with whatever undesirable consequences this might cause.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION
The executive plays a central role in determining how constitutional imperatives
are transformed into law. Of course, Members of Parliament play an important
role in the formal enactment of legislation. But the executive, not Parliament,
is the more influential constitutional actor between the two, at least in a
majority government.174 The process of translating abstract guarantees into
quasi-constitutional legislation is a complex one,175 and I only touch briefly on
that process in this article. The process would involve the executive assessing
the scope of its constitutional obligations as a whole and developing a way to
“prioritize”176 those obligations according to their relative importance. The
executive might do this by considering the acuteness of the risk of harm to
172. Ibid.
173. I am grateful to Peter Oliver for pointing this out to me. This is a general principle of
statutory interpretation. See Thibodeau, supra note 5 at para 89. See also Craig, supra note
138 at 385. It is also familiar in the federalism context.
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2001) 197 at 208; James B Kelly, Governing with the Charter: Legislative and Judicial Activism
and Framers’ Intent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) at 247; David Feldman, “Parliamentary
Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights” 2002 2 PL 323 at 347; Mark Tushnet,
“Interpretation in Legislatures and Courts: Incentives and Institutional Design” in Richard
W Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds, The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the
Constitutional State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 355 at 364-65, n 33
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176. Tom Campbell, “Introduction” in Tom Campbell, KD Ewing & Adam Tomkins, eds,
Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 1 at 6.

MacDonnell, A
 Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation 538

constitutionally protected interests, for example. It might also consider whether
some harms to constitutional interests exacerbate individuals’ vulnerabilities or
marginalization, or leave them unable to make ends meet.177
The theory of quasi-constitutional legislation I have described implies a
certain level of intentionality on the part of the executive. We know, of course,
that the executive is often not primarily or even significantly engaged with the
process of securing rights. As Mark Tushnet has explained, politicians are typically
concerned with re-election and with developing or supporting measures that are
likely to find favour with their constituents.178 The extent to which this is true
appears to depend on who is in power. A brief survey of the current legislative
calendar suggests that today’s executive is concerned with securing basic rights.179
Whether it has done a good job of reconciling competing rights claims is a more
complex question.180 Whatever the executive’s level of intentionality, it seems
clear that much legislation is in fact quasi-constitutional in nature.
The study of quasi-constitutional legislation also reveals that there is a great
deal of constitutionally significant activity that scholars of Canadian constitutional
law spend very little time analyzing.181 Not only is it important to be attentive
to the constitutional dimensions of lawmaking, it is also important to examine
what this tells us about the roles of constitutional actors. The executive has a great
deal of control over how constitutionally significant institutions are designed and
constitutional rights are implemented.

V. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates that the interaction between the Constitution and
ordinary law is more robust than the typical account suggests. It also shows that
the current rules that apply to the interpretation of quasi-constitutional legislation
are problematic. Following Khaitan, I have suggested that the best course of
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action is to interpret quasi-constitutional legislation purposively. A trumping rule
could be easily applied if a few pieces of legislation were quasi-constitutional in
nature. As I have explained, however, there is much more quasi-constitutional
legislation than the SCC has recognized. For this reason, courts should strive
to interpret this type of legislation to avoid conflicts where possible. Otherwise,
they should revert to the implied repeal rule and leave it to the political branches
to amend legislation if the implied repeal rule leads to undesirable consequences
from the standpoint of constitutional implementation.
The fact that legislation is shaped in significant part by constitutional
imperatives also means that we ought to adapt our existing theories of Canadian
constitutional law to better recognize the key role played by the executive
branch in advancing constitutional rights. We must also critically assess the
constitutional role that we have assigned to courts. It is clear that, to the extent
that legislation reflects the executive and the legislature’s best efforts to implement
constitutional rights, these efforts are deserving of deference.182 Given that such
legislation is pervasive, it appears that deferential judicial review of legislation
should be the norm.
The volume of quasi-constitutional legislation does not render the
characterization meaningless.183 On the contrary, it demonstrates how deeply
constitutional norms influence legislation. This conclusion should not be
surprising; we know, for example, that the Charter has been given a significant
role in the evolution of common law principles since 1982. It is time that we
recognize that the same is true with respect to legislation.
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